This paper studies trust and social capital through the writings of three eighteenth-century philosophereconomists --Hume, Smith, and Genovesi. It compares their accounts of the sense in which trust can be said to be rational, the conditions under which rational trust is possible, and the economic and social institutions which reproduce those conditions. These accounts are related to the modern literature of philosophy and economics. It is argued that the eighteenth-century writers use conceptions of rationality that are now marginalised. Dispsositions as well as actions are treated as objects of choice. Genovesi, but not Hume or Smith, relates trust to reciprocal friendship in a way that is foreign to modern rational choice theory, but might be represented by a theory of plural agency ('we-rationality'). While Smith sees the commercial virtues as the product of economic development, Genovesi sees trust as an essential precondition for such development.
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raised in the literature of social capital. That is, we will ask what different theories of trust can tell us about the conditions under which practices of trust can emerge and survive.
The mainstream view in current literature is that these questions should be posed in relation to the instrumental conception of rationality which dominates modern economics and game theory. However, there are dissenting voices which argue that other understandings of rationality are more useful in explaining trust.
One of the benefits of studying the history of thought is that we can go back to times when concepts which now have narrowly-defined meanings were interpreted more fluidly. We can then see the potential for a body of theory to have developed in other directions than it actually did, and this may help us to escape the limitations imposed by our current concepts. We shall argue that our eighteenth-century writers had a more open understanding of rationality than is characteristic of modern economics. Their accounts of trust rely on ideas about rationality which encompass both the current mainstream position and the positions of the dissenters.
Modern theories of trust and social capital
Our focus will be on theories which treat trust as something which, under the right conditions, is reproducible within a community of rational or reasonable individuals. The theories we shall discuss are intended to be both descriptive and normative. They are normative in that they characterise trust as rational: under appropriate conditions, trust can be recommended to rational persons. But they are also intended to explain the practices of trust that we find in the world. Thus, the conceptions of rationality that are built into these theories are offered as stylised or idealised representations of the forms of reasoning that ordinary people use when they engage in practices of trust.
The main modern account of the rationality of trust is based on the idea of reputation. It works by decomposing economic and social interaction into discrete games, each involving a relatively small number of individuals and occupying a relatively short stretch of time. Within a game, players choose whether to be 4 cooperative (that is, to repay trust) or not; everyone benefits if everyone is cooperative, but each has a selfinterested incentive to be uncooperative, even if the others are cooperative. Each individual plays the same type of game an indefinite number of times (perhaps with the same opponents, perhaps with different ones).
If individuals know something about the previous behaviour of their fellow-players, it is possible for them to follow conditional strategies --cooperating with, and only with, those who have been cooperative in the past.
In many such models, conditional cooperation is a Nash equilibrium. The usual interpretation given to these results is that trust can be sustained by rational self-interest, by virtue of the private value of a reputation for trustworthiness.
1 Given this theory of trust, we can ask what institutional structures tend to sustain the kind of trust on which markets depend. A number of theorists of social capital, including Mark Granovetter (1985) and Putnam (1993) , have argued that reputations for trustworthiness are most worthwhile in societies in which there are dense networks of civic engagement. 'Civic engagement' refers to all forms of association in which individuals cooperate as equals (or horizontally). Putnam's examples include neighbourhood associations, choral societies, cooperatives, sports clubs and political parties (p. 173). The 'density' of civic engagement is measured by the number, size and range of associations, and by the extent to which membership is crosscutting, so that most people are linked to most others by many different chains of association. In each association of which she is a member, a person gains benefits by having a reputation for trustworthiness.
Reputations are transmitted along the links in the network by virtue of the transitivity of trust: in Putnam's words, 'I trust you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trusts you ' (p. 169) . Thus a reputation earned in one association can be used to gain benefits in another. Conversely, a person's opportunistic actions in one association may exclude him from benefits in others.
The social capital embodied in a network of associations is partly a private good and partly a public one. A network of associations has the same kind of publicness as a telephone network. Just as one person's telephone connection is more valuable to him, the more other people have connections, so each person's ability to gain information from his membership of associations is greater, the more other people are members. Similarly, a person's trustworthiness is more valuable to her, the more trustworthy people there are for her to cooperate with. Writers in the social capital tradition stress the publicness of trust, arguing that because social capital is a public good, we cannot rely on the market to supply it in optimal amounts (see e.g. Coleman, 1990, p. 317 ).
An apparent difficulty for this account is that efficient markets depend on impersonal institutions which reach beyond the range of civic engagement, such as the merchant codes of conduct which governed long-distance trade in the Middle Ages, 2 capital and insurance markets, and bills of exchange. As these examples show, reliance on such institutions is not just a recent development. Some critics have argued that the market has been able to privatise trust, so that general trustworthiness --the personal characteristic about which information is transmitted through networks of civic engagement --is not required. The market provides incentives for individuals and firms to build reputations which are specific to particular types of interaction. For example, Susan Shapiro (1987) points out that the principal--agent relationship, which is crucial to the institution of the firm, is an instance of trust as a marketable commodity.
Perhaps recognising the need to respond to this kind of objection, theorists of social capital sometimes suggest that people who have learned the value of trust in one domain of economic or social life are better able to make use of trust in other domains. For example, Douglass North accepts that markets depend on impersonal commercial institutions, but argues that such institutions have developed most successfully in societies whose politics are based on informal norms of mutual restraint. On these grounds, North (1990, Chapter 12; 1998, p. 503 ) endorses Putnam's account of the differences between northern and southern Italy, and suggests that a similar contrast can be made between the Americas north and south of the Rio Grande. Putnam (1993, p. 174 ) may be making a similar point when he suggests that networks of civic engagement provide 'templates' for subsequent cooperative ventures. However, the mechanism by which trust is supposed to spread from one domain to another is not altogether clear. We suspect that these arguments depend on an implicit assumption that trustworthiness is something more than a reputation, built and maintained for instrumental reasons.
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An alternative account of the rationality of trust, which might provide the missing ingredient, has been developed by David Gauthier (1986) and Edward McClennen (1990) . As the theories proposed by these two writers are not quite the same, and as Gauthier has been more centrally concerned with the issue of trust, we shall concentrate on his theory. The idea is that trustworthiness is a disposition which guides a person's behaviour in a wide class of situations. The rationality of a disposition is assessed in instrumental terms, but over the whole class of situations in which it gives guidance, rather than case by case. In any particular case, an action is judged to be rational if it proceeds from a rational disposition, irrespective of the instrumental value of the action itself. A person's trustworthiness is instrumentally valuable to him to the extent that the possession of this disposition induces others to trust him, and thus allows him to achieve benefits of cooperation that are denied to the untrustworthy. Given that the general utility of trustworthiness makes it rational to have the disposition, it is rational to repay trust even in those cases in which the benefits of cheating outweigh the costs to one's reputation.
The disposition-based account of trust has many of the same implications for social capital as the reputation-based account does. As Gauthier's critics have pointed out, his argument depends crucially on an empirical assumption for which he offers surprisingly little justification: that each person's dispositions are known, if only imperfectly, by others (Gauthier [1986, pp. 172-174] ; Binmore [1993, pp. 136-140] is among the critics). If we are credibly to fill out Gauthier's argument, we must surely recognise that people learn about other people's dispositions mainly by observing those people's words and actions. Thus, a person's disposition to be trustworthy is valuable to him, only if he is interacting with people who know enough about his past behaviour to infer that he has that disposition. A disposition to be trustworthy is more valuable, and so more worth acquiring, when information can be transmitted through a dense network of associations. On
Gauthier's account, the individual does not switch her dispositions on and off according to the instrumental value of the actions they dictate. This stability of dispositions provides a mechanism, absent from the conventional theory of trustworthiness as reputation, by which trust can propagate from one domain to another. Networks of civic engagement might then be the seed-beds of trust.
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The reputation-based and disposition-based accounts of trust both depend on an individualistic conception of rationality. As Martin Hollis (1998, pp. 18-23) For Hollis, trust is a relationship of reciprocity. What he understands by reciprocity is something deeper than cooperation in the pursuit of self-interest. Thus, he looks for a theory of trust which can make it rational to repay trust, even when this is contrary to self-interest. But, for Hollis, trust is rational only among people whose relationships are based on reciprocity: the rationality of trust is not like a Kantian moral obligation. The expectation that the practice of trust will be generally followed, and that this practice will tend to work to everyone's advantage, is a precondition for the rationality of individual acts of trust.
Hollis suggests that we understand this kind of rationality as 'philosophical egoism in the first person plural' (p. 147). The idea is to develop a conception of rationality in which individuals can have reason to identify with the common interests of the social groups to which they belong. Then, in reasoning about a particular action that he might take, a person might think not 'This action has good consequences for me' or 'This action is prompted by a disposition which has good consequences for me', but 'This is my part of an action by us which has good consequences for us'. The possibility of we-rationality or team thinking --the possibility that collectives can be agents in a theory of rationality --has been suggested by Margaret Gilbert (1989) , Susan Hurley (1989) and Sugden (1993) . 4 The conditionality of rational trust corresponds with a distinctive feature of we-rationality: that a set of individuals cannot constitute a plural agent unless each of those individuals recognises that he is a part of that agent, and unless there is some level of mutual awareness of that recognition.
One of the difficulties to be faced by a theory of we-rationality is to explain how the consciousness of being a plural subject --of being a 'we' --comes about. We cannot go into the subtleties of Hollis's analysis
here, but one element in the formation of a plural subject is an network of engagements and loyalties among the component individuals. This leads to an understanding of social capital which is markedly different from that of Granovetter, North and Putnam. Hollis agrees with these other writers that trust is embedded in social institutions. But for Hollis, a network of civic engagement encodes and reproduces a community's consciousness of being a 'we', and so activates a form of reasoning within which trust is rational. Thus, social institutions do not merely set the parameters within which rational choices are made; they influence the content of rationality itself.
One distinctive feature of the we-thinking approach is that it allows recommendations to be addressed to collectives, as in the formulation 'Let us do . In this Section, we have sketched out three modern accounts of rational trust --a mainstream account and two marginalised alternatives. We now turn to our eighteenth-century writers, to see how they understood trust.
Hume on trust
In examining Hume's account of trust, our primary concern is with the argument of the Hume's accounts of the three laws follow a common pattern. He argues that there is no natural sentiment of justice. Benevolence is part of human nature, but benevolence springs from sympathy, and the force of sympathy depends on the closeness of the relationship between the people in question: we are benevolent to our family and friends, and to those whose happiness or misery is 'brought near to us, and represented in lively colours'. Justice is too impartial a concept to be governed by natural sentiments. While it is true that justice serves the public interest:
That is a motive too remote and too sublime to affect the generality of mankind, and operate with any force in actions so contrary to private interest as are frequently those of justice and equilibrium selection. 6 Just as a modern theorist would, Hume finds more difficulty in explaining why people respect de facto property rights than in explaining why promises are kept. The difficulty is that respect for acknowledged property rights seems to require a convention of mutual restraint that is followed by everyone in a society, whereas promise-keeping requires only that the promiser and the promisee are parties to the same convention. Hume is able to show how self-interest would generate respect for property in very small societies --small enough that any one person's failure to respect other people's property has a significant chance of bringing down the society-wide convention of mutual restraint (pp. 497-498).
Hume explains promising as a practice that evolves out of bilateral practices of mutual assistance, based on reciprocal self-interest:
Here I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him any real kindness; because I foresee, that he will return my service, in expectation of another of the same kind, and in order to maintain the same correspondence of good offices with me or with others. And accordingly, after I have serv'd him, and he is in possession of the advantage arising from my action, he is induc'd to perform his part, as foreseeing the consequences of his refusal.
(p. 521).
Around such practices there grows up a convention of marking promises by particular forms of words:
When a man says he promises any thing, he in effect expresses a resolution of performing it; and along with that, by making use of this form of words, subjects himself to the penalty of never being trusted again in case of failure... After these signs [of promise-making] are instituted, whoever uses them is immediately bound by his interest to execute his engagements, and must never be expected to be trusted any more, if he refuse to perform it.
(p. 522)
In this argument are all the essentials of the modern explanation of trust in terms of the value of reputation.
Having shown how self-interest is the original motive for justice, Hume goes on to explain 'Why we annex the idea of virtue to justice, and of vice to injustice' (p. 498). Hume appeals to 'sympathy with public interest' to explain our general approbation of acts of justice, in line with his more general theory that we naturally regard as virtuous, 'any action or sentiment [which] upon the general view or survey, gives a certain satisfaction' (p. 475). When the rules of justice are generally followed, we come to see their utility, and thus to approve of behaviour in accordance with them. It is important to recognise that, for Hume, this argument is intended only to explain why we regard justice as a virtue: it is not part of the explanation of why we obey the rules of justice. Since the utility of rules of justice is conditional on their being generally followed (that is why justice is an artificial virtue, not a natural one), the practice must exist before the sense of its virtue can develop; so we must be able to explain the emergence of the practice without appealing to a sense of virtue.
Also, sympathy with public interest is not a passion, but what Hume classes as a taste: 'Sentiments must touch the heart, to make them controul our passions: But they need not extend beyond the imagination, to make them influence our taste' (p. 586).
There is then a final stage in the argument. Given that rules of justice have emerged, and given that we have a natural inclination to approve of acts of justice because of our sympathy with public interest, the strength of our approval can be increased by public praise and blame, and by education. But these effects depend on the self-interested motive to justice. Parents teach their children to observe the rules of justice because their observing those rules is in the children's and the parents' interests (pp. 500-501); the most that moralists can hope to do is to show us more effective ways of satisfying our natural appetites (p. 521).
Significantly, when Hume is dealing with respect for property, he adds a further twist to the third stage of his argument. Once the association between justice and virtue is firmly established in people's minds, this gives rise to a further self-interested motive to acts of justice --'the interest of our reputation':
There is nothing, which touches us more nearly than our reputation, and nothing on which our reputation more depends than our conduct, with relation to the property of others. For this reason, every one, who has any regard to his character, or who intends to live on good terms with mankind, must fix an inviolable law to himself, never, by any temptation, to be induc'd to violate those principles, which are essential to a man of probity and honour (p.
501).
This is all that Hume has to say on this motive in the Treatise. It is not wholly clear how he intends us to understand 'the interest of our reputation'. Given the general thrust of the Treatise, it seems most natural to interpret the value of reputation instrumentally: a person's reputation for justice is valuable to him to the extent that it allows him to benefit from cooperation with others. On this reading, Hume is shoring up his explanation of respect for property by supposing that good and bad reputations can be transmitted between one domain of social interaction (respect for property) and another (promise-keeping). There is a parallel here with the idea of the transitivity of trust in the modern theory of social capital.
In the Enquiries, Hume returns to the issue of temptation which he touched on in the last quotation.
Although, as we have said, we are mainly concerned with the Treatise, this particular part of the Enquiries is Hume's frankest acknowledgement of a problem at the heart of his earlier account of trust. Hume is trying to prove that self-interest favours virtue in preference to vice. He thinks that this claim is easy to establish for what, in the Treatise, he called the natural virtues. But, he concedes, there is an apparent exception in the case of justice, where a man, taking things in a certain light, may often seem to be a loser by his integrity. And though it is allowed that, without a regard to property, no society could subsist; yet according to the imperfect way in which human affairs are conducted, a sensible knave, in particular instances, may think that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the social union and confederacy. That honesty is the best policy, may be a good general rule, but is liable to many exceptions; and he, it may perhaps be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom, who observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions.
(Enquiries, p. 283)
Here Hume seems to be recognising that if the theory of justice is based on self-interest and on the 13 instrumental value of reputation, we will not always have reason to act on the rules of justice (even though our tastes are such that we approve of ourselves when we do so).
Hume's first response to this objection is the assertion that 'inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our own conduct' are 'circumstances, very requisite to happiness, and will be cherished and cultivated by every honest man ' (p. 283 ). This response is consistent with other arguments in the Enquiries. The Hume of the Enquiries argues that 'love of fame' is a part of human nature, and one which 'brings a great addition of force to moral sentiment' --at least for those with 'noble natures'. In an argument which is echoed in Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, 7 Hume proposes that in pursuing fame, we constantly consider how we appear in the eyes of others. This leads us to desire, not merely to be regarded as virtuous, but actually to be virtuous (p. 276). However, this line of argument would not cohere well with the Treatise, with its emphasis on the power of self-interest and other natural passions. Since the sensible knave is just as much a problem for the Treatise, we prefer to focus on Hume's second response. This is that, as well as enjoying the pleasures of reflecting on his own conduct, the honest man has, besides, the frequent satisfaction of seeing knaves, with all their pretended cunning and abilities, betrayed by their own maxims; and while they purpose to cheat with moderation and secrecy, a tempting incident occurs, nature is frail, and they give into the snare; whence they can never extricate themselves, without a total loss of reputation, and the forfeiture of all future trust and confidence with mankind. (p. 283)
In this passage, Hume seems to be working in the domain of dispositions rather than of individual actions.
The argument is that, given the instrumental value of reputation, a person's self-interest is best served by his acting on a disposition to be unconditionally trustworthy. In particular, this disposition serves long-term selfinterest better than the disposition which leads the sensible knave to be trustworthy only when he calculates that trustworthiness will pay. This is exactly the claim by which Gauthier justifies his disposition-based theory of rational trust (although Hume sees dispositions as a means of self-control, while Gauthier sees them as a means of communicating commitments). Hume does not argue that trustworthy dispositions are chosen for instrumental reasons. For the honest man, the instrumental value of his disposition to honesty is not his
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reason for cultivating it. Nevertheless, because the satisfaction of seeing knaves discomfited is psychologically reinforcing, this instrumental value is part of the explanation of why in fact he has it. Thus, Hume offers a psychological theory to explain why dispositions towards trust are reproducible among selfinterested individuals.
Smith on trust and social capital
In the Wealth of Nations (1776/1976) Smith clearly recognises that justice --understood as the reliable enforcement of property rights and of contracts --is a precondition for the development of markets.
However, most of his discussion of this topic works from the premise that justice is supplied by government.
He says little about the spontaneous emergence of trust or mutual restraint; the idea that markets depend on informal trust is not stressed. Given Smith's general distrust of government and his fondness for invisible hand explanations, this omission may seem surprising. We shall argue that it is consistent with Smith's acceptance of a theory of rational trust which is remarkably close to what we have characterised as the mainstream modern position.
The importance which Smith places on justice is clear in his account of economic history. He traces the economic development of Europe back to the medieval towns. He sees the stability of property as an essential precondition for capital accumulation, since in the absence of such stability, no one has any incentive to acquire anything more than the bare necessities of life. He offers a political explanation of why the governments of the medieval towns gave more protection to property rights than did the feudal rulers of the countryside, and treats this factor as of primary importance in stimulating economic development (Smith, 1776 (Smith, /1976 .
In his discussion of the proper role of government, Smith recommends 'the obvious and simple system of natural liberty' in which each person is free to pursue his own economic interests, subject only to the laws of justice (p. 687). But natural liberty is possible only if those laws are enforced, and for this, we need government. Smith also seems to endorse the role of government in certifying the quality and quantity of traded commodities, in the minting of coins, and in banking (he comments favourably on the Bank of Amsterdam, which was a branch of that city's government [pp. 479-488] ). It is clear that Smith sees good government as essential to the proper functioning of markets, and that a good government must be trustworthy: its administration of justice must be impartial, its public finance must be honest and prudent.
But he does not put much emphasis on informal trust as a precondition for markets.
If markets depend on the trustworthiness of government, how is that trustworthiness to be guaranteed? Smith recognises the importance of this question, but he does not relate government trustworthiness to informal trust or civic engagement. Instead, his answer is to propose schemes of what would now be called performance-related pay (pp. 718-723, 758-765) . For Smith, it seems, the best means of ensuring that officials are trustworthy is to give them the right incentives.
Smith's most direct discussion of the economic significance of informal trust is the following passage in the Lectures on Jurisprudence:
Whenever commerce is introduced into any country probity and punctuality always accompany it. These virtues in a rude and barbarous society are almost unknown. Of the nations of Europe, the Dutch, the most commercial, are the most faithful to their word. The
English are more so than the Scotch, but much inferior to the Dutch, and in some remote parts of this country they are far less so than in the more commercial parts of it. This is not at all to be imputed to national character, as some pretend .... It is far more reducible to selfinterest, that general principle which regulates the actions of every man, and which leads men to act in a certain manner from views of advantage, and is as deeply implanted in an Englishman as a Dutchman. A dealer is afraid of losing his character, and is scrupulous in performing every engagement. When a person makes perhaps 20 contracts in a day, he cannot gain so much by endeavouring to impose on his neighbours, as the very appearance of a cheat would make him lose. Where people seldom deal with one another, we find that they are somewhat disposed to cheat, because they can gain more by a smart trick than they can lose by the injury which it does their character. (1763/1978, p. 538-539) This analysis reveals a sophisticated theory of trust. It is perhaps not clear whether Smith's concept of character is better translated into the modern game-theoretic concept of reputation or into Gauthier's concept of disposition; it seems possible to sharpen Smith's concept in either direction. But there is no doubt that this is a theory of individual self-interest.
The analysis also reveals a theory of social capital which in its fundamentals is quite similar to the modern theories of Granovetter and Putnam. Smith is arguing that reputations for trustworthiness are transmitted through networks of trading relationships; the denser the network of trading relationships, the greater is the value of reputation, and so --for purely self-interested reasons --the greater is the degree of trust. The context strongly suggests that 'self-interest' for the trader is to be understood simply as profit.
There is no suggestion in this passage that social approval is important in explaining the commercial virtues.
This is not to say that Smith does not recognise the motivating force of social approval. Much of the
Theory of Moral Sentiments is devoted to an analysis of just this force. Even in the Wealth of Nations,
Smith sometimes appeals to social approval to explain non-economic phenomena. At one point, for example, Smith discusses the social effects of the proliferation of small religious sects. In this discussion, he assumes that the main motive to moral behaviour is our desire for the approval of others. Thus, moral behaviour is sustained by the value of reputation, which in turn depends on there being a network of associations, so that contraventions of morality become generally known. By providing networks of association in anonymous cities, religious sects promote 'regular and orderly' morals among the common people (pp. 795-796). The logic of this analysis is very similar to that of the modern theory of social capital, but with the additional feature that networks of association provide channels for the transmission not only of information, but also of approval and disapproval.
Nevertheless, it is significant that in his discussion of the commercial virtues, Smith does not consider relationships other than trade. In the passage about the Scotch, the English and the Dutch, he seems to be arguing that in a developed market economy, trading relationships alone are dense enough to reproduce the trust that is necessary for the market to work, and that it is sufficient that those trading relationships are based on rational self-interest.
Far from seeing civic society as a precondition for markets, Smith tends to see commerce as the first stage in the development of civic society. This precedence is clear in Smith's economic history. In two chapters of the Wealth of Nations, he explains how during the Middle Ages, the order and good government of the towns gradually spread to the surrounding country, undermining previous relations of feudalism (pp.
397-427). Smith characterises feudalism in terms of vertical relations of patronage and dependence. Feudal societies began to decay when, motivated by individual self-interest, the landed proprietors diverted their surplus from the maintenance of retainers to the purchase of luxuries that were manufactured in the towns.
As an unintended consequence, the proprietors lost the basis of their former power and authority. Because of the division of labour in the market economy, purchasing power does not translate into political power as it does under feudalism:
Each tradesman or artificer derives his subsistence from the employment, not of one, but of a hundred or a thousand different customers. Though in some measure obliged to them all, therefore, he is not absolutely dependent upon any one of them. (p. 420)
Thus, the extension of the market makes possible a society of horizontal relationships --a society in which relationships between people are based on equality and reciprocity.
However, it would be truer to the spirit of Smith's argument to say that the market is a network of relationships of equality and reciprocity: it is not so much a precondition for, as an essential constituent of, civic society. This idea comes over very clearly in the famous passage at the beginning of the Wealth of Nations, in which Smith says that, to get our dinner, we do not address ourselves to the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker, but to their self-love. Immediately after this, Smith says: 'Nobody but a beggar chuses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens'. The message is surely obvious: market relations are between equals, and so allow us to achieve the benefits of the division of labour with dignity and self-respect. It is more consistent with human dignity for us to satisfy our wants through the market than through pre-market relations of generosity, patronage and dependence. For Smith, then, the market itself is a dense network of relationships within which individuals, motivated primarily by self-love, cooperate as equals for mutual benefit.
Thus, we suggest, Smith presents a theory of rational trust which is broadly similar to the modern theory of reputation. He also presents an account of social capital which, from a theoretical point of view, is similar to that proposed by modern writers such as Granovetter and Putnam. When there are dense networks of bilateral or multilateral associations, within which individuals cooperate as equals to secure mutual benefits, individuals are led by self-interest to build and maintain reputations for trustworthiness; and the trustworthiness so created is important for the functioning of markets. In principle, Smith's theoretical framework allows social approval to work as an additional factor in maintaining norms of trust, but he seems to think that commercial trust can be adequately explained in terms of self-interest alone. The main difference between Smith and the modern theorists of social capital is over the question of whether a market economy can create and sustain the informal trust on which it depends, without the additional support provided by non-economic networks of civic engagement. On this question, Smith seems to be on the side of the optimists.
Genovesi's economia civile
Genovesi's economics is grounded on the concept of fede publica --public faith or public trust. He presents a theory of trust and of social capital that is markedly different from those of Smith and Hume.
Like Smith, Genovesi began to study economics after teaching and writing philosophy. Just as in the case of Smith, scholars disagree about the degree of continuity between Genovesi's philosophy and his economics. Genovesi's account of human nature and of human action uses some Newtonian motifs (such as the idea of equilibrium as a representation of the relationship between the passions), but in its fundamentals it belongs to the Mediterranean tradition. Genovesi does not try to reduce human motivation to self-interest. In his Diceosina, he argues that some passions are manifestations of self-love (forza concentrativa), but others reflect 'love of the species' (forza diffusiva). Love of the species is not altruism (that is, concern for the wellbeing of others); it is a matter of relations between people. Its most basic element is sociality --the desire for relationships with our fellows. Sociality is 'an indelible feature of our nature', common to all social animals. We are 'created in such a way as to be touched necessarily, by a musical sympathy, by pleasure and internal satisfaction, as soon as we meet another man'; no human being, not even the most cruel and hardened, can enjoy pleasures in which no one else participates (Diceosina, Book I, Chapter 1, §XVII, p. 42). 10 Thus, it is essential to Genovesi's theory that social relations are not just means by which, or constraints within which, we satisfy self-interest. So far, of course, there is not a qualitative difference between Genovesi and Smith and Hume: both the Scottish writers are keenly aware of the ways in which human sentiments are responsive to interpersonal relationships. In Genovesi's work, however, there is a much stronger sense that these relationships are valuable in their own right: for Genovesi, it seems, the chief advantage of society is not to be found in its production of material goods, but in the enjoyment of social relationships.
Genovesi diverges more sharply from Smith and Hume in his emphasis on reciprocal assistance.
For Genovesi, there is a uniquely human propensity for reciprocal assistance, which results from the interaction of rationality and sociality. Following the natural law tradition, Genovesi argues that each person has a natural right to the benefits of reciprocal assistance and a corresponding duty to provide them for others (Lezioni, I, ch. I, §18, p. 27). Thus, a person's willingness to help those who stand in relations of reciprocity 20 towards him is a virtue, analogous with the virtues of justice and honesty. In common with the veteres, Genovesi understands economic relations as relations of reciprocal assistance: in an economic system, each agent is helping others to satisfy their wants. On this conception of economics, engagement in economic relations is an exercise of virtue.
The contrast with Hume's Treatise and Smith's Wealth of Nations is evident. Hume's explanation of mutual assistance as the product of rational self-interest --the idea that we can help people without bearing them any real kindness --would be foreign to Genovesi's approach. So too would Smith's idea that the uniquely human trait which governs economics is the propensity to truck, barter and exchange. As we have said, Hume and Smith are sensitive to the ways in which sentiments are adjusted through interpersonal relations; these processes of adjustment are crucial for both writers' theories of the moral sentiments.
Nevertheless, the Scottish writers effectively remove economic relations from the realm of sociality. They do this is three ways. First, their fundamental conception of economic relations is in terms of individuals' pursuit of self-interest within the constraints set by the rules of justice; there is no sense that in their economic relations, people act together or help one another. Second, the moral sentiments which make justice a virtue are presented as being only distantly related to the virtues of friendship and benevolence which bear on personal relations: the gap between the two is essential to Hume's distinction between natural and artificial virtues. Third, Hume and Smith play down the role of the moral sentiments in governing economic relations at all: as we have shown, they try to explain economic trust as the exercise of far-sighted self-interest. By drawing a distinction between private virtues, such as friendship and benevolence, and the public utility of justice and the market, the Scottish writers open the way for invisible hand arguments: perhaps public utility does not require --perhaps even, is not best served by --private virtue. Genovesi explicitly rejects this idea, which he attributes to Mandeville 11 (Lezioni, II, ch. X, § 29, p. 188).
The implications of Genovesi's more social account of economics become clear in his discussion of trust. To understand the significance of fede publica in Genovesi's theory, it is important to understand the history of the Kingdom of Naples. At the time that Genovesi was writing, many years of Spanish domination
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had destroyed the networks of civil society which had existed since the pre-Roman era. 12 It was only in 1724 that Naples had become an independent kingdom under Bourbon rule. The decades following this event were an era of new hope for a civil and enlightened government. Genovesi was one a group of thinkers who tried to understand the failures of the old regime and to find new routes to economic and social development.
In his Discorso sopra il vero fine delle lettere e delle scienze (Discourse on the true end of letters and sciences) of 1754, a manifesto for the Neapolitan Enlightenment and for his own research programme in economics, Genovesi asks why Naples is not a developed nation like other states in Italy or the nations of northern Europe. Naples, he says, is well populated; it is 'a seminary of noble and gifted people'; it has one of the best climates in Europe; having good access to the sea, it is well-placed for the development of commerce (pp. 28-31). What has gone wrong?
Genovesi's answer, which comes at the end of his Discorso, is that Naples has lacked buon costume, 'the most efficacious ... cause of the wealth, power and happiness of a people' (p. 50). Buon costume, literally 'good custom', has no simple translation into English. The closest equivalent is probably 'common decency'.
It signifies customary standards of acceptable or decent behaviour; it is that basic level of virtue which everyone is entitled to expect of everyone else. For Genovesi, then, virtue is an economic resource.
In his economic writing, Genovesi explains the role of virtue in promoting economic development.
The most comprehensive statement of his ideas is the Lezioni di commercio o sia di economia civile (Lectures on commerce and civil economics), published during 1765-67. What is effectively a first draft of part of the Lezioni was published in 1757 as Ragionamento sulla fede publica (Reasoning on public trust).
That Genovesi should initially choose to publish just this part of his lectures signals that public trust is the starting point for his economics.
Genovesi's economics, like Smith's, is an enquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. people who undermine the reputations of their trades by individual acts of cheating) (Lezioni, II, ch. X, § 20, . In punishing such crimes, there must be no discrimination by rank, since if there were such discrimination, the disfavoured individuals would learn not to contract with the favoured (II, ch. X, § 28, pp.
186-187).
The most important difference between Genovesi's and Smith's discussions of public trust is to be Naturally, the solution has to be the cultivation of ethical trust. The main tool for this task is the civil and religious education of the people, adults as well as children, by the Church and in public schools (Lezioni, II, ch. X, § 7, . As a true Enlightenment thinker --and in sharp opposition to Hume --Genovesi believes that true virtue is recommended by correct reason. Thus, the way to make people virtuous is to give them a rational education.
To 1. Nature and reason both push us to seek happiness.
2.
No human condition is more unhappy than to be alone, separated from any relations with other people.
3.
Thus, we must try to be sociable with one another and to cultivate the virtues which enable us to live companionable and friendly lives.
4.
But sociability is not enough for human society; there is human society only when men are united by the will to be useful to one another.
5.
The peculiarity of human society is that it is based on rationality, not reciprocal pleasure.
6. This kind of rational society cannot be achieved unless the people who compose it are reciprocally and sincerely friendly with one another.
7.
Men cannot be sincerely friendly with each other unless they have sincere confidence in one another.
8.
Only where everyone is persuaded of each other's virtue and piety can there be this sincere confidence.
9.
As soon as any member of society is known to be ready to offend and deceive people, everyone sees him as one with whom it is impossible to deal or to communicate.
10.
Such a person is excluded from all social relationships, and can get none of the comforts that make life pleasurable.
11.
It is impossible that such a situation can last for long; the community will soon send that
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person away from civil and natural society.
One significant feature of this catechism is the close association it makes between friendship and trust. For a reader who is more familiar with the writings of Hume and Smith, or with the literature of modern economics, this association comes as a surprise. Friendship, one might think, is a private relationship among specific individuals who are linked by ties of affection, while trust --or at least, the kind of trust which underpins the market --is impersonal, and based on interest rather than affection. Genovesi does not accept this distinction. As the first three propositions in the catechism make clear, he postulates a universal human desire for social relationships and takes this to be the primary motive for social cooperation. Ethical trust --which, for Genovesi, is the foundation of economic and political cooperation --is rational in the same sense that friendship is: it is a precondition for social relationships. Thus, for Genovesi, trust is embedded in social relations in a much deeper sense than it is for Smith and Hume, or for modern theorists of social capital.
The catechism also reveals that for Genovesi, rationality is a property of dispositions and not of actions. Notice that Genovesi is recommending us to cultivate sincere friendship for one another, and the will to be useful to one another. The emphasis on dispositions is made still clearer when, in revising the catechism for the Lezioni, Genovesi inserts a new proposition between those formerly numbered 8 and 9, which declares that 'It is not possible for men to be mutually persuaded of the virtue of their fellows if they are not really virtuous. In fact the simulation of virtue is sooner or later found out' (Lezioni, II, ch. X, § 10, p. 163). This revision seems to be Genovesi's response to the problem that Hume presents in the person of the sensible knave; like Hume, Genovesi responds to the problem by arguing that our interests are better served by settled dispositions towards trustworthiness than by instrumental reasoning at the level of actions.
What exactly is a disposition towards friendship? The logic of Genovesi's argument suggests that we should identify friendship with reciprocal assistance, reciprocity being understood in an individually noninstrumental, non-calculating way. A person with this disposition does not simply act in a way which is useful to others, expecting that they in return will act in ways that are useful to him: that would be the sort of mutual assistance analysed by Hume, which does not require any real kindness. But neither is he altruistic: the will to be useful is conditional on the confidence that that will is reciprocated. The friendly person wants to be useful to others, having confidence in their wanting to be useful to him. If we are to represent this mode of reasoning in modern terms, we suggest that the most useful framework to use is the rationality of werationality, as advocated by Hollis.
If we think in these terms, we have to ask: for whom is the disposition of friendship rational --for people severally, for people collectively, or for both? Genovesi's catechism betrays some ambiguity on this matter, which is perhaps best resolved by taking his answer to be 'for both'. The content of the first eight propositions seems to be this: We, that is human beings collectively, can achieve happiness only in societies;
societies are possible only among people who are disposed to be useful to one another; within any putative society, everyone's having that disposition is possible only if everyone is disposed towards sincere friendship, and confident that the others are so disposed. It would be a natural continuation to say: So let us all cultivate the disposition of friendship. This reading would cohere with Genovesi's diagnosis of the failure of Naples to achieve economic development as the result of a collective deficiency of buon costume. However, the final propositions of the catechism warn each individual that if he fails to cultivate the virtues of friendship, there will be adverse consequences for his happiness. (Significantly, these adverse consequences are in the currency of sociality rather than material self-interest: what the individual stands to lose are relationships with others.) We take it that Genovesi is addressing his readers both individually and collectively. Individually, each of us can best achieve happiness by being ready to form relations of friendship with others who are similarly inclined. Collectively, we can best achieve happiness by acting together in relations of friendship.
For Genovesi, then, social capital consists in fede publica --in a common and mutually-recognised commitment to the virtues of friendship and reciprocal assistance. Or perhaps we should say that social capital consists in a network of associations which are based on those virtues and that propagate them. Public trust is an essential precondition for the development of markets. The conclusion of his Lezioni provide an icon of this approach to economics. Markets, he says, depend on networks of communication:
The canals of communication are both physical and moral. Solid, easy, sure roads; rivers 27 and ferries; pulling machines; and if there is sea, ports, the mechanisms of ships, the security of navigation, are the former. ... But we need moral canals too (Lezioni, II, Conclusione, § 13, p. 274).
Conclusion
Having discussed these various eighteenth-century and modern theories so briefly, it would be presumptuous for us to try to adjudicate between them. Our aims are more modest. We hope that our reflections on the work of Hume, Smith and Genovesi have led readers to think more deeply about trust and social capital.
More particularly, we hope we have made our readers more willing to consider what are now seen as unorthodox approaches to theorising about these issues.
In the modern theory of rational choice, rationality is seen as a property of individual actions. We have suggested that, for our eighteenth-century writers, the concept of rationality was less narrowly defined, and could encompass dispositions as well as actions. A disposition guides a person's actions in a range of cases which, despite their differences, are treated as similar. If we assume that people tend to adopt dispositions which, on the whole, lead to desired outcomes, we may be able to explain how the virtue of trustworthiness can survive in a market economy, even though that virtue sometimes requires individuals to act contrary to their interests. If dispositions matter, there are also implications for the way we need to think about social capital. If trustworthiness affects both market and non-market relations, then the viability of trust in markets might depend on the existence of a sufficiently rich network of non-market associations in which that disposition can generate benefits. Or --as Smith may have thought --vice versa.
More fundamentally, the modern theory of rational choice is a theory of individual rationality.
Hume, Smith and Genovesi were all concerned with people in relation to one another in a way that is foreign to most modern economics. But although Hume and Smith develop relational theories of the moral sentiments, their explanations of the practice of trust assume that people are primarily motivated by selfinterest. It is to Genovesi that we must look to gain a sense of how a theory of trust might be grounded on a relational theory of rationality. We have suggested that Genovesi's concept of reciprocal assistance is best understood in terms of a rationality of 'we-thinking' --of plural agents.
What of the question which lies behind so much of the continuing debate about social capital: Do markets undermine relations of trust? One important lesson to be learned from the eighteenth-century literature is that trust is not, as social commentators sometimes casually suppose, a survival from a premodern era of close-knit rural communities. From their different eighteenth-century perspectives, Smith and
Genovesi both see trust as a modern phenomenon. Smith thinks that trust is a product of commercial society;
Genovesi's concern is that an economically backward society may lack the trust that is a precondition for commerce. But to say that trust is modern in this sense is not to be confident about the reproducibility of trust in market economies at the beginning of the twenty-first century. All of the theories we have considered, whether based on reputation, disposition or reciprocal assistance, provide reasons for thinking that trust is propagated within networks of associations of people who cooperate for mutual benefit. If the expansion of the market causes such networks to decay, we should not be complacent.
